Egypt Monthly Report

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CHAPTER 1

Egypt's Monthly Macroeconomic Barometer

The data released between the middle of July and the middle of August 2026 describe an economy that has moved out of balance-of-payments danger while its domestic engine still runs cold. External buffers reached their strongest level on record, the public accounts closed the eleven months to May with the widest primary surplus Egypt has reported, and the seventh review of the Fund programme was completed without disruption. Set against that, consumer prices turned up after three months of easing, industrial output fell in May, and the non-oil private sector contracted for a seventh consecutive month. The month did not settle the central question of 2026; it sharpened it. Cairo has bought liquidity and time, but not yet a domestic growth cycle capable of carrying the adjustment once the current wave of external inflows normalises.



Figure 1. Nine months at 5.2% and a full year at 4.6% leave a fourth quarter near 3%. That quarter is the month's most important number and it has not been published.

On the real side, the Ministry of Finance confirmed on 10 August that real growth reached 5.2% over the first nine months of fiscal year 2025/2026, and that budget-sector debt has fallen by 13.2 percentage points of gross domestic product since 2023. The nine-month figure is strong; the full-year projections around it are not. The International Monetary Fund now puts fiscal year 2025/2026 growth at about 4.6% and fiscal year 2026/2027 at 4.4%, the latter revised down from 4.8%. The World Bank holds 4.3% and 4.8%. A nine-month rate of 5.2% and a full-year rate of 4.6% imply a fourth quarter, covering April to June 2026, of roughly 3%. That is the most important number in this month's data set, and it has not yet been published.

The high-frequency evidence points the same way. The production index for manufacturing and extractive industries, excluding crude oil and petroleum products, fell to 130.02 in May from a revised 135.79 in April, a decline of about 4.3%. One month is not a trend, but it is the first hard output reading pointing the opposite way from the growth figures. The labour market moved the other way. Unemployment fell to 5.8% in the second quarter of 2026 from 6.0% in the first, the labour force expanded to 35.64 million from 35.41 million, and the number of unemployed declined to 2.08 million from 2.13 million. The published survey does not break that gain down by sector.

Prices are where the month turned. Annual urban headline inflation accelerated to 14.9% in July from 14.3% in June, ending three months of easing. The nationwide rate rose to 13.0% from 12.2%, and the general index reached 289.9 points after a monthly gain of 0.1%. Core inflation rose to 14.7% from 14.3%. The mechanics matter more than the headline: monthly urban inflation printed at exactly 0.0%, against negative 0.4% in June, and monthly core inflation also printed at 0.0%, against 0.3%. The annual acceleration is therefore almost entirely a base effect from a soft July 2025. Measured month against month, prices were flat, among the softest readings of the year, though June was softer still.



Figure 2. The annual rate accelerated while the monthly rate printed at zero: the acceleration is a base effect, not fresh price pressure.

The composition is less reassuring than the momentum. Housing, water, electricity, gas and fuels rose 31.1% over the year, with imputed rents up 50.9% and actual rents up 28.1%. Transport and communications rose 21.1% and education 20.0%. Food and beverages, the heaviest weight in the basket, accelerated to about 8.0% from 5.4%, the fastest in 14 months, even though food prices fell 0.6% during the month itself. Retail fuel prices have not moved since 10 March. Shelter and services, not fuel, are now carrying the index.

Monetary policy has stayed where it was. At its meeting on 9 July the Monetary Policy Committee held rates for a third consecutive time, leaving the overnight deposit rate at 19.00%, the overnight lending rate at 20.00% and the main operation and discount rates at 19.50%. The committee expects headline inflation to rise through the third quarter, though more slowly than it forecast in May, and now sees convergence towards the 7% target in the second half of 2027. The next decision falls on 20 August.

The liquidity data have to be read at constant exchange rates. Domestic liquidity fell in absolute terms to 15.261 trillion pounds in June from 15.330 trillion in May, but foreign-currency deposits account for more than the whole of that decline, falling to the equivalent of 3.264 trillion pounds from 3.425 trillion. Converted at the average official rate of each month, 49.2763 and 52.3297 pounds per dollar, those same deposits rose from about 65.4 billion dollars to about 66.2 billion. The pound value fell because the pound appreciated, not because savers left the dollar; stripped of that revaluation, broad money grew rather than contracted. The local-currency side did change: non-government pound deposits rose to 10.347 trillion from 10.168 trillion, while currency circulating outside the banking system fell to 1.649 trillion from 1.737 trillion, consistent with cash moving into interest-bearing deposits.

External buffers strengthened further. Net international reserves reached 56.294 billion dollars at the end of July, up 1.222 billion in the month, crossing 56 billion for the first time and extending the run of consecutive monthly increases to 47. The foreign-currency component rose to 38.7 billion dollars from 37.85 billion, and gold rose to 17.14 billion from 16.8 billion on price alone, holdings unchanged at 4.169 million ounces. A 1.5 billion euro European Union tranche was the main new inflow. Banking-sector net foreign assets jumped to 27.965 billion dollars in June from 22.9 billion in May, though part of that increase is the same revaluation effect rather than accumulation.

The pound has been the quietest variable in months. It closed around 49.74 to 49.84 pounds per dollar in the first week of August and traded near 50.00 to 50.20 by the middle of the month, against roughly 50.70 in late July. Across 2026 the currency has ranged between 46.63 and 54.69, so present stability sits close to the mid-point of a very wide year. Market panels now expect about 49 pounds per dollar by the end of fiscal year 2026/2027, while the budget assumes an average of 47.

The external accounts remain the structural weak point. Customs data for May showed exports of 4.53 billion dollars, imports of 8.52 billion and a trade deficit of 3.99 billion, marginally narrower than a year earlier and well below April's deficit of 4.80 billion. Natural gas imports rose 96.8% over the year and wheat imports 33.5%. The balance-of-payments framework tells a heavier story for the nine months to March: a merchandise deficit of 47.8 billion dollars, wider by 24.6%, and a petroleum trade deficit of 13.1 billion, wider by 26.8%. The two data sets are not in conflict. Customs records physical merchandise crossing the border; the balance of payments records goods on a change-of-ownership basis, with adjustments for coverage, timing and valuation, and it includes free-zone trade.



Figure 3. Remittances, tourism and canal receipts against the merchandise gap, with net foreign direct investment shown separately as financing rather than earnings. Remittances are published for eleven months; the nine-month figure is marked on the same bar so the comparison can be read on one basis.

Foreign-currency inflows are doing the work of closing that gap. The current account deficit for the nine months to March was about 14.6 billion dollars, yet the overall balance of payments deficit narrowed to 1.8 billion from 1.9 billion. The capital and financial account delivered net inflows of 9.9 billion dollars against 7.7 billion, with net foreign direct investment at 13.0 billion against 9.8 billion, offset by portfolio outflows of 4.4 billion that reversed inflows of 2.1 billion a year earlier. Remittances reached 43.1 billion dollars over the eleven months to May, up 31.2%. Tourism receipts reached 14.4 billion over nine months, up 14.9%, and canal receipts rose 22.1% to 3.2 billion, with quarterly canal revenue improving to 1.26 billion in the second quarter from 1.10 billion in the first. Remittances are now more than three times canal earnings; the external position rests on labour income abroad rather than on transit.

The debt picture reflects both the improvement and its cost. Total external debt edged up to 164.776 billion dollars at the end of March from 163.911 billion at the end of December, but the composition improved: long-term debt rose to 134.251 billion from 129.490 billion while short-term debt fell to 30.525 billion from 34.421 billion. Maturity has lengthened, which reduces rollover risk without reducing the stock. Roughly 62.8 billion dollars of external service falls due between April 2026 and March 2027.

Fiscal execution is the clearest positive in the period. Over the eleven months from July 2025 to May 2026, the overall deficit narrowed to 1.133 trillion pounds, or 5.3% of gross domestic product, from 1.184 trillion pounds and 6.5% a year earlier. The primary surplus rose 70% to 985.1 billion pounds, or 4.6% of output, from 580.4 billion and 3.2%. Total revenues rose 32.5% to 2.976 trillion pounds, with tax revenue up 27.5% to roughly 2.5 trillion. The constraint is unchanged: interest payments rose 20.03% to 2.12 trillion pounds, equal to 52.3% of total expenditure of about 4.05 trillion, while public investment remained capped at 1.2 trillion.



Figure 4. In the FY2026/27 budget, interest payments alone exceed wages and the whole of social protection combined by some EGP 764 billion.

Social spending is expanding within that envelope rather than against it. The budget for fiscal year 2026/2027, in force since 1 July, carries expenditure of 5.178 trillion pounds against 4.574 trillion previously, on revenues of 4.0 trillion. Subsidies, grants and social benefits were raised 12% to 832.3 billion pounds, including 175.3 billion for food subsidies covering more than 60 million people and 55.3 billion for Takaful and Karama and related transfers. Wages rise to 822.8 billion pounds from about 679 billion. Wages and social protection together, at roughly 1.655 trillion pounds, remain below the 2.419 trillion allocated to interest. The government targets a primary surplus of 5.0% of output, a deficit of 4.9% and budget-sector debt of 78.1% by June 2027, on assumptions of 47 pounds per dollar and 75 dollars a barrel.

The private sector remains the outlier. The purchasing managers' index rose to 46.8 in July from June's 46.0, a 41-month low, but stayed below the neutral 50.0 mark for a seventh month. New orders fell for a seventh month, purchasing activity contracted at the steepest rate since September 2023, and input inventories declined for the first time in five months. Employment fell again, though only marginally, while backlogs rose at the second-fastest rate in almost three years, pointing to bottlenecks rather than idle capacity. The forward-looking components improved: delivery times shortened for the first time since March, input cost inflation eased to a six-month low, output price inflation to a four-month low, and business confidence reached its highest level since June 2022. The survey is consistent with annual growth of about 4.0%, against 3.8% in June.

Imported prices are the main external threat to the inflation path. The global food price index rose to 131.1 points in July from 130.4, its highest since January 2023, with cereals up 3.4%, wheat quotations up 5.8% in the month and 9.9% over the year, and vegetable oils at a four-year high. Egypt's cereal import requirement for 2026/2027 is put at 29 million tonnes, including 13.5 million tonnes of wheat, against a domestic crop near 10 million tonnes. Commodity data for July showed Brent averaging 83.4 dollars a barrel, down from 85.4, but European gas rising to 18.06 dollars per million British thermal units from 15.17. The energy agencies diverge unusually widely: on 12 August the producers' group cut its 2026 demand-growth forecast to 580,000 barrels a day from 780,000, while the consumer agency projected demand falling by 1.6 million barrels a day. Brent traded near 88 dollars by mid-August. A spread of that width argues for stress-testing the energy import bill rather than adopting a single price.

No rating agency acted during the period. Egypt remains at single-B with a stable outlook at two agencies and at Caa1 with a positive outlook at the third, positions set between April and May. The programme anchor was reinforced on 30 July, when the Fund's board completed the seventh review under the Extended Fund Facility and the second under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, releasing about 1.8 billion dollars and lifting cumulative disbursements to roughly 7.3 billion. Gross reserves were assessed at 119% of the adequacy metric at end-June. The Fund expects headline inflation near 16.7% in the second half of 2026 and describes structural reform progress, particularly divestment, as uneven. Liquidity metrics have improved while structural delivery has not, and the ratings have so far moved with neither.

On this evidence, August urban headline inflation is likely to print between 15.2% and 16.0%, with a central expectation near 15.6%, and core inflation between 14.9% and 15.6%. The monthly rate should return to positive territory at roughly 0.7% to 1.1%, driven by imported cereals and vegetable oils, continued shelter and services adjustment, and seasonal demand ahead of the school year, partly offset by the fuel-price freeze and the stronger pound. That range is built from the July index level, the average monthly increase of the past four months, and the base effect implied by August 2025. Real growth for the first quarter of fiscal year 2026/2027, covering July to September 2026, is likely to land between 3.9% and 4.4%, with a central expectation near 4.1%, anchored on the survey-implied rate for July and adjusted for the weaker industrial reading. The bands below are period averages for calendar quarters, and the weights are judgemental rather than model output.

EXCHANGE RATE SCENARIO MATRIX

SCENARIO	WEIGHT	KEY CONDITIONS	USD/EGP BAND, PERIOD AVERAGE, Q4 2026 – Q1 2027	LEADING SIGNAL TO WATCH
Constructive	20%	Normal transit through Hormuz lowers the energy bill; Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb security improves and canal volumes recover; portfolio inflows resume	46.5 – 49.0	Net portfolio inflows in two consecutive months
Base	55%	Reserves keep rising; remittances above 3.5 billion dollars a month; eighth review on schedule; Brent 80–90 dollars	49.0 – 52.0	Monthly reserve print stays positive
Adverse	20%	No Hormuz settlement; wheat and gas hold at current levels; renewed portfolio outflows; canal traffic plateaus	52.0 – 56.0	Foreign-currency deposits, measured in dollars, rise for two consecutive months
Severe	5%	Renewed regional escalation combined with a delay in the eighth review	56.0 – 62.0	Reserves fall in two consecutive months, or the review slips past its scheduled date

The base case assumes the current equilibrium holds: reserves keep rising, remittances stay above 3.5 billion dollars a month, the eighth programme review proceeds on schedule, and Brent trades between 80 and 90 dollars. In that world the pound stays broadly where it is and easing can begin late in the year without provoking outflows. The constructive case needs two separate things: normal transit through the Strait of Hormuz, which lowers the energy import bill, and improved security in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, which is what actually restores canal volumes. It is the most direct route to sustained appreciation, and it turns on political outcomes rather than policy choices. The adverse case does not require a new war, only the absence of a settlement: wheat and gas sustained at current levels, renewed portfolio outflows and canal traffic that plateaus would widen the current account faster than inflows can cover. The severe case combines renewed escalation with a delay in the review, and is the only case in which reserve deployment, rather than exchange-rate adjustment, becomes the first line of defence.

In summary, the period from mid-July to mid-August 2026 left foreign reserves and the primary balance at their strongest readings of the period under review. Reserves reached 56.294 billion dollars, the primary surplus reached 4.6% of output over eleven months, the deficit narrowed to 5.3%, and the Fund released a further 1.8 billion dollars. Inflation rose to 14.9% on base effects while the monthly rate was flat, and the pound held near 50 per dollar. The constraints are equally clear: interest absorbs 52.3% of spending, external debt stands at 164.776 billion dollars with 62.8 billion falling due over twelve months, the private sector has contracted for seven months, and industrial output fell in May. The next quarter will test whether stabilisation can be converted into production, because external liquidity unmatched by output growth eventually returns as pressure on the currency it now supports.

CHAPTER 2

Social Media Marketing in Transition

Social media marketing is undergoing a transfer of decision authority. For most of the past decade the marketer chose the audience, the placement, the budget and the creative, and the platform executed those choices. That arrangement is ending. The platform now makes most of those choices, and the marketer supplies objectives, data and assets. Everything else in the discipline follows from that single shift, including where discovery happens, who makes the content, where the transaction closes, and what counts as proof that any of it worked. Five structural changes are visible today, and they reinforce each other rather than competing for attention.

Five Structural Changes



Figure 1. The agency benchmark behind the 23%-to-35% comparison, shown in full. It measures share of spend, not the share of advertisers adopting. The two quarters cited are marked; the series peaked at 38% in the first quarter of 2025 and has since fallen back to 27%. The direction of travel is not in doubt, but the level is not a one-way ratchet.

The first and most consequential is the move to automated media buying. Meta reported that in the fourth quarter of 2025 it doubled the computing power used to train its main advertising ranking model and adopted an architecture that reads longer sequences of user behaviour, producing a 3.5% lift in ad clicks on Facebook and a gain of more than 1% in conversions on Instagram, with a separate run-time model raising conversion rates across Instagram surfaces by about 3%. TikTok's automated suite now selects among brand creative, creator content and machine-generated assets on the advertiser's behalf, while its commerce tool automates campaign creation and spending and has been extended to account for affiliate costs, discounts and platform fees. Adoption is measurable, though the samples are narrow: in one large agency benchmark covering United States retail and e-commerce advertisers, about 35% of Meta spending went through automated shopping campaigns in the second quarter of 2025, against roughly 23% a year earlier, and about 46% of marketers reported using AI in bidding and mid-flight optimisation in 2025, up from 41% in 2024. The commercial scale behind this is what makes it hard to reverse: Meta's advertising revenue reached about 196.18 billion dollars in 2025, higher by 22.1%, with impressions up 18% and average price per ad up 6% in the final quarter, and the three largest advertising platforms are forecast to absorb about 58% of global advertising spending outside China in 2026. These performance estimates are reported by the platforms themselves and should not be treated as independently validated causal effects.

The second change is that creator-led short-form video has become the default unit of production rather than one format among several. The underlying evidence is strongest for creator marketing as a category: a recent meta-analysis synthesised 1,531 effect sizes drawn from 251 papers across 27 countries and found consistent relationships with attitudes, engagement, purchase intention, purchase behaviour and sales, with perceived credibility doing much of the persuasive work. That body of work covers influencer marketing broadly rather than short video specifically, so the format claim rests on platform behaviour and production practice rather than on the meta-analysis. Meta reports that partnership formats converting creator posts into paid placements deliver on average around 19% lower acquisition costs and 13% higher click-through rates than standard formats, which is a platform-reported average and not a guarantee of the same effect for any individual advertiser. The operational consequence is that content velocity, not content polish, has become the binding constraint, and that brands increasingly rely on creators' established credibility rather than building it in-house. Most short-video studies remain observational, so they establish association rather than proof of cause.

The third change is that social platforms have become an important first point of product discovery, particularly among younger users. A representative United States survey found that 62% of adult TikTok users cited product reviews or recommendations as a reason for using the platform, against 44% of Instagram users, and the figure reached 74% among users aged 18 to 29. Industry tracking in early 2026 put the share of United States consumers who have used TikTok as a search tool at about 49%, and at roughly 65% among the youngest adult cohort, while a survey covering the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia found around 41% of that cohort turning to social platforms first for information against about 32% who default to a search engine. Platforms are building for this directly: TikTok introduced brand-owned search destinations at the top of its results page in May 2026, alongside a tool turning high-performing comments into clickable search prompts. The practical implication is that optimisation now extends into the video itself, since retrieval draws on spoken words, on-screen text, captions, hashtags, sounds and prior interaction history rather than on page metadata. These are stated-preference surveys rather than observed logs, and should be read as direction rather than magnitude.



Figure 2. The age gap in discovery. Stated preference from consumer surveys rather than observed logs, so the direction is firmer than the magnitude.



Figure 3. One platform's in-app marketplace, on a single forecast vintage. The market total it is compared against is the source document's own, and is kept out of the plot rather than spliced in from a different forecast round.

The fourth change is that the transaction has moved inside the application. Forecasts place TikTok's in-app marketplace at roughly 23.4 billion dollars in United States sales in 2026, close to a quarter of a domestic social commerce market projected above 100 billion dollars, and the platform extended native booking into travel during 2026. A meta-analysis of 119 social commerce studies found the strongest associations for relationship quality, emotional support and perceived value, which is consistent with a socially mediated purchase process, though the underlying studies measure association rather than mechanism. The funnel that marketing has taught for thirty years, moving a customer from awareness through consideration to a website, is collapsing into one surface. The limitation is important and frequently ignored: the large majority of social commerce research measures stated purchase intention rather than completed purchases, which can materially overstate commercial impact.

The fifth change is regulatory rather than commercial, which is why it is likely to prove the most durable. A randomised study involving more than 70,000 advertisers estimated that optimising campaigns using off-platform purchase signals, rather than optimising for clicks, lowered the median cost of acquiring an incremental customer from 49.93 dollars to 38.16 dollars, a difference of about 23%; the study tested that specific comparison rather than the removal of all external behavioural data, and two of the authors were platform employees at the time. European rules now prohibit profiling-based targeting on sensitive categories and targeted advertising to users the platform knows with reasonable certainty to be minors, and transparency obligations covering certain machine-generated or manipulated content have applied since 2 August 2026. The combined effect is that advertisers are being pushed towards consented first-party data, platform-native signals, modelled conversions and designed experiments. Privacy restriction and automation are not opposing forces; the loss of observable signal is precisely what makes probabilistic modelling necessary.

What a Marketing Team Is For

The organisational consequence is a change in what a marketing team is for. When selection, bidding and optimisation move into the platform, the skills that used to define seniority in media buying may decline in relative value, and three different capabilities become scarce instead. The first is data custody: whoever controls consented first-party data controls the quality of everything the machine subsequently decides. The second is experimental design, because in an environment where every platform reports favourable results the only defensible answer to whether spending worked is a test the advertiser controls. The third is creative direction at volume, since the constraint shifts from producing one strong asset to producing enough distinct assets for a selection system to have something to choose between. Agency economics move with this, and fees tied to the volume of media managed are likely to come under more pressure than fees tied to measured incremental outcomes, data infrastructure and creative supply, though this remains a directional judgement rather than a documented shift.

Prediction Is Not Causation

This brings the analysis to the harder question of what these systems will be doing three years from now. The starting point is that prediction and causation are different things, and the industry still routinely confuses them. Across 15 large advertising field experiments involving roughly 500 million user-experiment observations, observational attribution methods repeatedly failed to reproduce the randomised causal estimates, even after extensive statistical adjustment. A system can identify buyers with high accuracy without the advertisement having caused a single additional purchase. Where prediction has been connected to a genuine intervention the results are real but narrower than the marketing language around them: a randomised field experiment found that machine-generated personalised video advertising raised engagement by 6 to 9 percentage points over personalised images and generic video, which is causal evidence about engagement and not about revenue.



Figure 4. The same page of results, sorted by how the results were produced. Rows are not comparable with one another; the separation is the point.

The infrastructure for the next phase is already shipping, and the sequence matters. In May 2026 TikTok released a server allowing external AI systems to connect directly to its advertising platform and to create, manage, optimise and analyse campaigns without a human operating the campaign manager, alongside a developer toolkit for building custom advertising agents. On 30 June 2026 it launched a marketplace of ready-made agent skills built on that server, with 14 named partners at launch, covering campaign creation, creative generation, performance analysis and catalogue management. Search platforms have shipped comparable agents that build campaigns, read performance and implement changes under stated authorisation. The direction of travel is not ambiguous. What remains genuinely uncertain is how much authority organisations will delegate, and that is a governance question rather than a technical one.

By 2029 the defensible expectation is supervised augmentation rather than autonomous marketing. Functions tied to pattern recognition should be almost entirely machine-run: bid setting, budget reallocation, audience construction, creative variant generation, continuous testing, anomaly detection and reporting. Functions tied to meaning should remain human: what the brand stands for, which risks are acceptable, what to do when something goes wrong, how to read a cultural moment, and who is legally answerable for the output. The most important organisational change is quieter than either of those. Measurement should move from last-touch attribution towards incrementality as the default question, because once a machine is optimising continuously against a metric, the choice of metric becomes the only real point of control the marketer still holds. A team that automates execution while leaving attribution unreformed will simply optimise the wrong outcome more efficiently.

Five constraints justify caution about anything stronger. Models decay as preferences and platform mechanics shift, so performance depends on retraining cadence rather than model quality alone. Optimisation creates feedback loops, because yesterday's ranking determines the behaviour on which today's model trains, which narrows exposure over time. Incomplete or skewed data can systematically disadvantage particular groups. Experiments cost money and are operationally awkward, so the discipline that keeps automation honest is the first thing cut under budget pressure. And synthetic saturation carries its own penalty: an experiment on machine-generated advertising disclosure found that transparency labelling reduced advertising attitudes, with the sharpest effect among consumers already sceptical of the technology, though that study was small and measured attitudes rather than sales.

Applying This in Arab Markets

One further limitation deserves particular weight for anyone applying this in Arab markets. None of the causal studies cited here directly estimates effects in Arab markets; the randomised evidence comes from United States field experiments, a global advertiser sample and a messaging experiment conducted in India. Their effect sizes should therefore not be transferred without local validation. Language shapes what a retrieval system can index, creator credibility is culturally specific, payment and delivery infrastructure differs sharply across the region, and the regulatory environment follows neither the European model nor the American one. Firms operating here should treat imported benchmarks as hypotheses to be tested locally rather than as parameters to be adopted, and should budget for local experimentation accordingly.

SCENARIO MATRIX: DELEGATION OF MARKETING AUTHORITY TO 2029

SCENARIO	WEIGHT	OPERATING CONDITIONS	HUMAN ROLE BY 2029	LEADING SIGNAL TO WATCH
Supervised augmentation	55%	Agents execute within stated limits; humans approve consequential changes; incrementality testing becomes routine among larger advertisers	Objectives, brand meaning, exception handling, legal accountability	Share of budget governed by a controlled experiment rather than platform attribution
Bounded agent delegation	25%	Regulation stabilises and measurement proves reliable unattended; agents hold spending authority across platforms within caps	Macro budget approval, periodic audit, brand safety review	Advertisers granting agents direct spending authority through platform interfaces
Constrained adoption	20%	Stricter enforcement, weaker match rates, consumer resistance to synthetic content or weak incremental returns	Manual control retained on high-value campaigns; coarser targeting	Measured incremental returns falling below manual benchmarks in published tests

The three plausible states of the world in 2029 differ mainly in how much authority is delegated and how well measurement holds up. In the central case, agents handle execution within stated limits while humans approve consequential changes, and incrementality testing becomes routine among larger advertisers. In the faster case, mature organisations grant agents bounded spending authority across platforms and human review moves from every decision to exceptions and periodic audit, which requires that regulation stabilises and that measurement proves reliable enough to trust unattended. In the constrained case, stricter enforcement, weaker match rates, consumer resistance to synthetic content or disappointing incremental returns lead firms to cap automation, targeting becomes coarser, and high-value campaigns retain manual control.

In summary, social media marketing is being reorganised around systems that select rather than merely deliver, and the five current trends are facets of that one change: automated buying, creator-led short video, discovery inside feeds, transactions inside applications, and targeting redesigned around privacy limits. Platform-reported gains are material, but their external validity remains unverified, and the persistent weakness is that engagement, intention and purchase are still treated as interchangeable when they are not. By 2029 the defensible expectation is supervised augmentation, with execution largely automated and objectives, brand meaning and legal responsibility retained by people. The decisive capability will not be access to the tools, which will be universal, but the discipline to measure whether they caused anything. In Arab markets that discipline has to be built locally, since the available evidence has not yet been estimated on regional audiences.